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Summary
 The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 
significantly limited the tax benefits to companies for 
charitable donations of intellectual property.  This 
has arguably restricted within the U.S. the influence 
and distribution of technology to limited or non-
developing user groups, such as nonprofits and 
universities.  Notwithstanding this decrease in benefits, 
the growth of an international licensing model may 
provide a new domestic framework for exploiting tax 
provisions surrounding charitable IP contributions 
through the operational mechanics of patent pools.  
Increased consideration of patent pools is important 
for other reasons as well.  The growth of university 
commercialization offices facilitating enhanced 
industry-academic relations and the increasing 
complexity of commercial products, most notably in 
the biotech field, are just a sampling of factors calling 
for broadened use of large-scale collaborative models of 
exchange.  
 How, then, can U.S. firms take advantage of 
implicit pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits through 
the patent pool structure; or, more specifically, how 
can firms donate their shelved, unworkable patents 
towards a common good, while also taking advantage 
of goodwill and federal tax incentives?  While this 
article does not offer a prettily packaged answer to 
the question, it does provide a useful analysis of the 
relevant IP and taxation principles and concerns 
that must be factored into any attempt at a soluble 
approach towards a balancing of the respective federal 
and societal interests involved.  This article fits squarely 
at the intersection of intellectual property and tax 
law, exploring cooperative developments seeking to 
disseminate intellectual property while circumventing 
tax limitations of the Jobs Act. 
 In order to test the workability of a tax-friendly 
patent pool, one must first grasp the relevant law and 
theory establishing patent pools generally, and more 
specifically patent pools as charitable contribution 
stores.  Section I thus surveys environmental conditions 
leading to the creation of modern patent pools, and 
defines modern patent pools.  Section II surveys the 
landscape of the U.S. federal tax provisions governing 
technology transfer, with a particular emphasis on 
establishing intellectual property transfers as charitable 
contributions.  Section III makes use of the IP and 
tax related principles and rules though a case study 
involving an international patent pool devoted to 
environmental sustainability and cleantech innovation.
I.    Creation and Supporting Environments of 
Modern Patent Pools
 Modern patent pools are relational constructs 
designed to overcome common problems associated ith 
corporate ownership of advanced technologies.  These 
relationships are fused by shared interests of product 
development; they are also stressed by the competitive 
positions of researchers and executives involved, and 
by the oversight of antitrust and tax regulators.  These 
facilitators and hindrances are analyzed in greater detail 
below.
A. A Brief Note on the Cooperative Landscape of 
Academia
 This article explores the functions of patent 
pools, which are intellectual property collectives of 
otherwise-competing corporate entities.  Because 
sandbox etiquette learned in the laboratory spills over 
to the boardroom, it is worthwhile to first consider 
in this critique some cooperative strains of patent 
pools amongst academic researchers.1  In the academic 
arena, “user innovators” have adopted a widespread 
“social norm” of ignoring others’ intellectual property 
rights during the course of research.2  A general lack 
        *  Kevin Christopher is a 2011 graduate of the University of 
San Francisco School of Law, and author of this article through 
the UC Hastings Law and Bioscience (L.A.B.) Project.  The author 
thanks Professors Robin Feldman and Dominick Daher, fellow 
L.A.B. participants, and the American University Intellectual 
Property Brief staff for their guidance and contributions.
1.  Insular institutional norms may negatively influence 
the later work of researchers, students, and even administrators.  
Fortunately, academic institutions are increasingly investing in 
programs dedicated to mentoring entrepreneurial researchers in the 
business arts.  Notable examples include the California Institute for 
Quantitative Biosciences (http://qb3.org/) and the IC2 Institute at 
the University of Texas (http://www.ic2.utexas.edu/).
2.  Katherine J. Strandburg, User Innovator Community Norms 
at the Boundary Between Academic and Industrial Research, 77 
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of enforcement sustains this practice, and is likely due 
to an emphasis on innovation per se, as opposed to a 
commercial emphasis on innovation for profit.3  In 
other words, academics seek glory in publication, rather 
than proliferation, and in this vein tread harshly on the 
discovery rights of their colleagues.  This self-interested 
approach to publication leads to a normalized 
takings research mentality.  However, when requests 
are properly made for use of protected technologies 
during the course of research, there is widespread 
dissatisfaction with delay and general resistance to peer-
related lending and facilitation.4  In sum, academic 
research environments tend to foster a general mindset 
of resistance to cooperative relationships, stemming 
mostly from competitive pursuits of publication that 
inevitably impact institutional prestige, funding, and 
royalties.5
 At the intersection of academic science 
and industry, commercialization partnerships 
have greatly increased, exemplified by a tripling of 
university funding sourced from private industry, 
with a concurrent five-fold increase in the share of 
domestic patents sourced at the university level.6  
Still, university-sourced patents represent a mere six 
percent of the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office’s (“USPTO”) annual registry.7  While collegial 
commercialization developments are outside the focus 
of this article, it should be noted that universities 
present valuable proving grounds for novel methods 
of innovation, both in the laboratory and executive 
boardroom.8
Fordham L. Rev. 2237, 2257 (2009).
3.  Katherine J. Strandburg, Norms and the Sharing of 
Research Materials and Tacit Knowledge, in Working within 
the Boundaries of Intellectual Property Transactions: 
Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society 85, 85 
(Rochelle C. Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2010). But see Bronwyn H. Hall, 
On Copyright and Patent Protection for Software and Databases: A 
Tale of Two Worlds, in Econ., L. & Intell. Prop. 259, 261 (Ove 
Granstrand ed. 2003) (noting that “in reality R&D environments 
display a continuum between the most private industry settings and 
the ‘open source’ community”).
4.  See Strandburg, supra note 3, at 87 (Interestingly, whether 
a scientific tool requested by a collegial entity is patented has little 
impact on a solicited holder’s refusal to share materials).
5.  See, e.g., the University of California San Francisco, 
Office of Technology Management, academicaffairs.ucsf.edu/
welcome2009/OTMflyer.pdf (“Without strong research, there will 
be no commercialization”).
6.  See Hall, supra note 3, at 264-65.
7.  Id.
8.  See, e.g.,  Ron Leuty, UCSF harvesting Big Pharma deals: 
Pfizer, Bayer and Sanofi seed new crop of drugs, S.F. Bus. Times, Jan. 
21, 2011, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/
print-edition/2011/01/21/ucsf-harvesting-big-pharma-deals.html 
B. Cooperative Corporate America and the Role 
of the Patent Pool
 For commercial developers, the landscape of 
innovation and invention is more complex.  While 
academics work on specific projects within narrowed 
academic fields, commercial developers make products 
interfacing numerous technological fields, often already 
covered by thousands of patents and trade secrets.9  
Due to the USPTO’s specificity requirements,10 
even the most basic products incorporate patents to 
numerous subcomponents resulting in “IP thickets” 
that hinder development of many socially beneficial 
technologies.11  Modern product developers often find 
themselves in a web of licensing, stymieing otherwise 
straightforward executive agendas.12  Navigating 
patent thickets have thus led to innovative forms of IP 
transactions, including “patent trolls,”13 whereby third-
(reporting on direct industry investment into UCSF research in 
excess of $100 million); Carol Mimura, Nuanced Management of IP 
Rights: Shaping Industry-University Relationships to Promote Social 
Impact, in Working within the Boundaries of Intellectual 
Property Transactions: Innovation Policy for the 
Knowledge Society 269, 285 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss et al. eds., 
2010) (discussing the Socially Responsible Licensing Program at 
the University of California, Berkeley, an effort to provide accessible 
pharmaceuticals to developing countries).
9.  See O’Connor, IP Transactions as Facilitators of the 
Globalized Innovation Economy, in Working within the 
Boundaries of Intellectual Property Transactions: 
Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society 204, 204 
(Rochelle C. Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2010). 
10.  See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03, 112 (2011) (outlining 
requirements of novelty, non-obviousness, and written specificity for 
inventions seeking patent protection).
11.  See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bargaining Over the Transfer 
of Proprietary Research Tools: Is this Market Failing or Emerging?, 
in Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property 
Transactions: Innovation Policy for the Knowledge 
Society 223, 223 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, et al. eds., 2001) (“As 
intellectual property claims proliferate in rapidly advancing fields 
of technology, new research paths often cross the boundaries of 
many prior patents.  Without an exemption from infringement 
liability, subsequent innovators need licenses from multiple 
predecessors to pursue such research projects.  Whether this state 
of affairs promotes innovation or retards it is an empirical question 
of considerable complexity.”); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the 
Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 
Harv. L. Rev. 621, 684 (1988); Merges, Institutions for Intellectual 
Property Transactions: The Case of Patent Pools, in Expanding 
the Boundaries of Intellectual Property Transactions: 
Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society 123, 126 
(Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, et al. eds., 2001) (“The basic idea is that 
granting too many property rights of too small a scale can preclude 
effective exploitation of economic resources.”)
12.  See O’Connor, supra note 9, at 204.
13.  Joe Brennan, et al., Patent Trolls in the U.S., Japan, 
Taiwan, and Europe, 13 CASRIP Newsletter (Spring/Summer 
2006), available at http://www.law.washington.edu/Casrip/
Newsletter/default.aspx?year=2006&article=newsv13i2BrennanEt
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party speculators or aggregators buy up IP to enforce or 
resell the rights, and patent pools, a more cooperative 
framework of IP centralization.14
1.   Historical Basis and Evolution of the 
Patent Pool
 Patent rights are property rights employing 
a “tradeoff model” balancing the costs of monopoly 
with a legal inducement of innovation.15  Patent pools 
began with “repeat-play” bargaining groups anticipating 
sustained business interactions involving one another’s 
property rights.16  These early innovators formed the 
administrative entities recognizable today and are 
responsible for broad licensing of bundled IP rights 
assigned by member donors.17  Today, organizations 
like the American Society of Composers, Authors, 
and Publishers (“ASCAP”), have bundled IP rights to 
issue blanket licenses, thereby significantly reducing 
transaction costs for expansive, centralized commercial 
inventories.18  In turn, royalties are distributed 
according to weighted value of licensed property.19
2.  Principles of Modern Patent Pools
 Patent pools mirror the blanket issuance 
framework used by ASCAP, though in this sense 
patent inventories are administered primarily to 
donor members, with varying reservations for third-
party licensing.20  Simply stated, a patent pool is 
created when patent holders assign or license their 
rights to an independent entity with authority to 
exploit those rights through further licensing or 
manufacturing endeavors.21  Licensees benefit from 
Al  (identifying a patent troll, patent extortionist, patent parasite, 
patent pirate, patent speculator, patent mafia, or patent rougue as 
“somebody who tries to make a lot of money off a patent that they 
are not practicing and have no intention of practicing and in most 
cases they never practiced at all.”).
14.  See O’Connor, supra note 9, at 204.
15.  See Standard Oil Co. Ind. v. Unites States, 283 U.S. 163, 
167-68 (1931); Merges, supra note 11, at 123; see also Kenneth J. 
Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources to Invention, 
in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activities (Richard 
R. Nelson ed., 1962), reprinted in Essays in the Theory of Risk-
Bearing (Markham Pub. Co. ed., 1971).
16.  Merges, supra note 11, at 128.
17.  Id.
18.  Id. at 129.
19.  Id.
20.  Id.
21.  Id. at 133 (While helpful to distinguish the modern 
modes of pooling, Professor Merges’ singular definition is adequate 
for purposes of this article); see also Verbeure, Patent Pooling for 
Gene-based Diagnostic Testing: Conceptual Framework, in Gene 
Patents and Collaborative Licensing Models: Patent Pools, 
Clearinghouses, Open Source Models and Liability Regimes 
pools by way of “all-in-one license[s]” circumventing 
the need for individually securing licenses from patent 
owners.22  On the one hand, patent pools “regularize 
frequent interactions” among technologically complex 
industries with complementary patents, while on the 
other hand, patent pools provide a one-stop shop for 
diffuse producers and bulk purchasers.23  Patent pools 
also eliminate stacking licenses or reduce defensive 
aggregation, decrease patent litigation, enhance 
technical exchange of non-patented work, and generally 
stimulate funding to all pool members.24  Drawbacks 
associated with patent pools include skepticism over 
industry coordination as a detriment to consumer 
interests, as well as uncertainty in the form of coalition 
stability.25  Moreover, patent pools may “shield invalid 
patents…entail inequitable renumerations… [and] have 
anticompetitive effects.26  Scholars generally disagree as 
to the proportional benefits of patent pool membership 
with respect to producers versus consumers, large-scale 
as opposed to small-scale developers, and private groups 
contrasted with public groups.27
3, 5 (Geertui Van Overwalle ed. 2009) (discusses three types of 
patent pools unofficially known as “joint licensing schemes,” “patent 
pools with a licensing administrator,” and “patent platforms.”).  
22.  Verbeure, supra note 21, at 5.
23.  Merges, supra note 11, at 130.
24.  See Geertrui Van Overwalle, Designing Models to Clear 
Patent Thickets in Genetics, in Working within the Boundaries 
of Intellectual Property Transactions: Innovation Policy 
for the Knowledge Society 305, 309 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss et. 
al , Diane L. Zimmerman, & Harry First eds., 2010).
25.  See Steffen Brenner, Optimal formation rules for patent 
pools, 40 Econ. Theory 373, 374 (2009).
26.  See Van Overwalle, supra note 24 at 309.
27.  See Yochai Benkler, A Political Economy of the Public 
Domain: Markets in Information Goods Versus the Marketplace of 
Ideas, in Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property 
Transactions: Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society 
267, 273 (“[I]ncreases in the scope and reach of property rights 
benefit commercial producers who sell information goods, at the 
expense both of noncommercial producers and of producers who 
appropriate the benefits of their production by means other than 
the sale of rights…Moreover, increases in the scope and reach of 
property rights favor large scale organizations that own information 
inventories over small scale organizations (including individuals) 
that do not own such inventories.”); see also Ashish Arora, Andrea 
Fosfuri, & Alfonso Gambardella, Markets for Technology and 
Corporate Strategy, in Econ., L & Intell. Prop. 77, 105 (Ove 
Granstrand ed. 2003) (pointing out the opportunities for startups 
and small firms to profit from technology trade “even if they are 
unable to mobilize the costly assets to develop, produce and sell 
[their proprietary technologies]”); Rudy Santore, Michael McKee 
& David Bjornstad, Patent Pools as a Solution to Efficient Licensing 
of Complementary Patents? Some Experimental Evidence, 53 J.  L. & 
Econ. 167, 182 (2010) (“Our laboratory experiments show that 
profit-seeking agents can coordinate licensing arrangements in 
complicated situations fairly effectively with the opportunity to 
set prices jointly.  In the case of strictly complementary patents, 
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3.  Structuring a Patent Pool
 Upon its establishment, the first priorities 
for a patent pool are determining rates for access to 
the entire pool and how income will be distributed 
to donor members.28   Patent pool makers must 
consider how exchange and enforcement costs will 
drive membership, with lower transactional costs 
inviting increased activity.29  As an important note for 
the tax discussion below, a patent pool “regularizes 
the valuation of individual patents” by creating “a 
division of royalties according to the value attributed 
the gains arising from permitting collusion (measured as market 
efficiency) appear to be substantial, and the extreme examples of 
coordination failure are avoided.”); Verbuere, supra note 21, at 
26 (“Patent pools may raise visibility and accessibility towards 
smaller or public genetic laboratories and thus may increase the 
actual amount of collected royalties by increasing its mass, thereby 
bridging the gap between potential and actual revenue.”). But 
see Jorge A. Goldstein, Critical Analysis of Patent Pools, in Gene 
Patents and Collaborative Licensing Models: Patent 
Pools, Clearinghouses, Open Source Models and Liability 
Regimes 50, 56 (Geertrui Van Overwalle ed. 2009) (“Especially 
in the biopharmaceutical sector, players are confronted by large 
costs and long regulatory times, and are not inclined to pool their 
IP with that of others who may not have invested the large sums 
required for drug or diagnostic approvals.  The biopharma culture 
is much more like that of a solitary long-distance runner with one 
winner and multiple also-rans, that that of a team of synchronized 
swimmers.”); Brenner, supra note 25 at 374 (“In general, the social 
and private benefits of pool creation do not coincide.”). 
28.  See Merges, supra note 11, at 131.
29.  Id. at 132; see also Brenner, supra note 25, at 374 
(observing that the benefit to social welfare is a function of 
decreased competition, increased membership, and reduced 
pricing).
by the parties to their respective claims.”30  A pool 
must also consider whether its administrative functions 
will be executed through an independent group or 
an independently operated subgroup of particular 
donors.31  Typical administrative powers include adding 
and subtracting property rights to or from the bundle 
of rights, restructuring royalty payments, and settling 
disputes.32 
 An effective patent pool contains three 
essential elements: contributing members with access 
to all pooled patents, available licensing plans for non-
contributing members, and a formulaic distribution of 
licensing fees that weighs the contributory importance 
of pooled technologies.33  A pooling collective should 
offer a streamlined and accessible menu of prices 
and terms to licensees only after “extensive internal 
consultation”34 involving patent attorneys, technical 
experts, and legal counsel – a “long, complex, multi-
30.  See Merges, supra note 11, at 133; see also Standard Oil Co. 
Ind. v. Unites States, 283 U.S. 163, 167-68 (1931).
31.  See Lawrence A. Horn, Case 1. The MPEG LA Licensing 
Model: What Problems Does it Solve in BioPharma and Genetics?, in 
Gene Patents and Collaborative Licensing Models: Patent 
Pools, Clearnighouses, Open Source Models and Liability 
Regimes 33, 36 (Geertui Van Overwalle ed. 2009) (“The license 
administrator is neither licensor nor licensee (nor an affiliate of 
any); both are customers, thus assuring impartial administration of 
the joint license with a goal of balancing reasonable access for users 
with reasonable return to patent owners.  Each licensing program is 
administered separately, fairly and impartially.”).
32.  See Merges, supra note 11, at 140.
33.  Id. at 129.
34.  Id. at 131.
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step process.”35  Patents included in the pool must be 
enforceable under antitrust laws, and must not exclude 
complimentary patents.36  Patentees should preserve 
some authority over licensing conditions and should 
commit under non-exclusive terms.37  Indeed, a survey 
of sixty-three patents from 1895 to 2001 found that 
pools of complimentary patents generally featured 
independent licensing provisions and grantbacks.38
4.   Model Patent Pools and Industry Impact
 Patent pools can be “creatures of necessity” 
when previously registered patents control foundational 
technologies necessary for entry into a high-tech 
commercial field, or towards development of certain 
commercial products.39  Inasmuch, successful patent 
pools are usually those linked to complex technologies 
that could not otherwise be broadly developed, if at 
all.  As discussed below, patent pools are currently 
responsible for important consumer electronics, and are 
poised to serve as vehicles for biotech development.
a.  MPEG-LA & MPEG-2
MPEG-2 was first created by the licensing 
agent MPEG-LA to combine 29 video compression 
patents among 9 international patent holders.40  
MPEG-LA administers the pool and licenses the patent 
portfolio to outside developers.41  In 2001, MPEG-
LA included fourteen patent-holding members with 
35.  See Verbeure, supra note 21, at 7.
36.  See Richard Gilbert, The Essentiality Test for Patent Pools, in 
Working within the Boundaries of Intellectual Property: 
Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society 326, 341-43 
(Rochelle C. Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2010).
37.  See Verbeure, supra note 21, at 7, 14; see also Princo Corp. 
v. Intern’l Trade Comm’n, 2010 WL 338593 (August 30, 2010); 
Thomas V. Vakerics, Antitrust Basics, § 11.02 at 6, 7 (2009) (“It 
is well established that a patentee may license or assign its patent, 
vesting a licensee with full rights under the patent or a limited right 
to practice the teachings of the patent.  In licensing a patent, it is 
also well established that a licensor may impose restrictions on the 
use of the patent, even where those restrictions are designed to limit 
competition in practicing the patent.”).
38.  See Josh Lerner, Marcin Strojwas & Jean Tirole, The 
Design of Patent Pools: The Determinants of Licensing Rules, 38 
RAND J. of Econ. no. 3, 610-25 (2007); see also Vakerics, supra 
note 37, at 10 (“A grantback provision requires the licensee to 
license back to the licensor any related technology, including 
patented technology, which the licensee may develop during the life 
of the original license agreement…grantbacks are in fairly common 
use throughout the United States in patent licensing agreements.”).
39.  See Merges, supra note 11, at 134.
40.  See MPEG-LA, http://www.mpegla.com/main/default.
aspx (MPEG-LA is the self-touted “pioneer of patent pools”) (last 
visited April 10, 2011); see also Merges, supra note 11, at 147.
41.  See MPEG-LA, supra note 40.
fifty-six essential patents.42  Today, MPEG-LA includes 
twenty-seven members with hundreds of essential 
patents and over 1500 licensees.43  Some notable 
features of the MPEG-2 pool include the following: (i) 
blanket licensing; (ii) a royalty based system according 
to representation; (iii) expert administrative valuation 
procedures for determining royalties and licensing 
fees; (iv) a negotiation framework for determining 
value of new entries to the pool combined with expert 
analysis initially surveying 8,000 patents for inclusion; 
(v) categorization according to “essential patents” 
(foundational) and “related patents” (improvement); 
(vi) opt out provisions directed to pool members to 
protect bargaining leverage, not applicable to essential 
patents; and finally, (vii) a dispute resolution program.44
b.   DVD4C & DVD6C
In addition to the MPEG-LA patent pool, 
another successful single-technology patent pool 
involves DVD technology.  The modern patent pools 
DVD4C and DVD6C were originally a collaborative 
ten-member pool administering DVD technologies 
that eventually split into two pools for ideological 
reasons.45  The DVD4C pool now consists of four 
of the ten core members, while DVD6C retains the 
other six members and includes a portfolio of over 800 
patents.46  The DVD pools are noteworthy because 
two competing pools covering the same technology 
were able to further the industry as a whole.47  The 
members of the patent pools administer their respective 
members, while employing an independent expert 
for valuation purposes.48  Other single-technology 
patent pools have included digital video broadcasting, 
synthetic fibers, flat-panel speakers, and RAM memory 
chips.49  Notwithstanding that advantages of the patent 
pool, some goods produced by the “sweat of the brow,” 
including some software, books, musical compositions, 
games, and audio and video productions, have little 
use for collaborative arrangements such as patent pools 
since there are few obstacles to producing viable and 
useful products in those industries.50
42.  Id.
43.  Id. at http://www.mpegla.com/main/programs/M2/Pages/
Intro.aspx (last visited April 10, 2011).
44.  See Merges, supra note 11, at 147-49.
45.  Id. at 150-52; see also Van Overwalle supra note 24, at 
310.
46.  See Van Overwalle, supra note 24, at 310.
47.  See Merges, supra note 11, at 147-49.
48.  Id. at 152.
49.  Id. at 154.
50.  See Hall, supra note 3, at 261; see also Benkler, supra 
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c.  Potential For Biotech
 The USPTO has long endorsed patent pools 
in the biotech industry.51  The biotech industry is 
particularly noteworthy “because of the density of 
the relationships and the speed and complexity of 
its organizing process.”52  Yet despite the speed of its 
scientific developments, biotech suffers from similar 
delays that plague academia.53  Other difficulties 
particular to biotech include inflated valuation for 
unproven discoveries.54
d.  Corporate Appeal of Pooling
Academics studying IP development have 
observed a rise of corporate strategic alliances, 
indicating the heightened importance of transactions 
for deployment of information technology.55  Within 
this burgeoning transactional economy, globalization 
note 27, at 269 (“[B]ecause people and organizations who 
produce information for different motivations and with different 
organizational constraints are likely to produce different types of 
information content, decisions about property rights in information 
content must be held to a normative accounting in terms of their 
effects on the patterns of, strategies for, and ultimately the locations 
and content of information production in our society.”).
51.  See Jeanne Clark, Joe Piccolo, Brian Stanton, & 
Karin Tyson, Patent Pools: A Solution to the Problem of Access in 
Biotechnology Patents? 8 USPTO White Paper (2000) (“For example, 
the recent patent pool encompassing MPEG-2 technology led to the 
rapid formation of a standardized protocol to protect copyrighted 
works on the Internet.  Similarly, patent pools can eliminate the 
problems associated with blocking patents or stacking licenses in 
the field of biotechnology, while at the same time encouraging the 
cooperative efforts needed to realize the true economic and social 
benefits of genomic inventions.”).
52.  Walter W. Powell, Networks of Learning in Biotechnology: 
Opportunities and Constraints Associated with Relational Contracting 
in a Knowledge-Intensive Field, in Expanding the Boundaries of 
Intellectual Property Transactions: Innovation Policy for 
the Knowledge Society 251, 263 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, et al. 
eds., 2001).
53.  See Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 225 (noting that in 
the biotech industry lengthy negotiations “over the transfer 
of proprietary research tools present[s] a considerable and 
growing obstacle to progress in biomedical research and product 
development”); see also Powell, supra note 52, at 259 (“As the 
structure of the [biotechnology] field became shaped more and 
more by interorganizational relations, the nature of competition was 
altered.  The participants had to adjust to the novel view that it was 
no longer necessary to have exclusive, proprietary ownership of an 
asset in order to extract value from it.”).
54.  See Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 243 (“[T]ool users within 
each sector share the perception that tool-providers in other sectors 
are asking too much and overvaluing the contribution of particular 
tools relative to other inputs that contribute to future valuable 
discoveries.”).
55.  See Ashish et al., supra note 27, at 80 (observing alliances 
“ranging from R&D joint ventures and partnerships, spin-
offs, corporate venture capital, licensing deals, and a variety of 
‘outsourcing’ deals”).
and favorable market forces have led to large-
scale exploitation of technology through licensing 
arrangements.56  Similarly, diversity of scalable 
technologies, along with the diffusion of technological 
producers, means that companies committed to 
internal research and development departments 
are unnecessarily “reinventing the wheel.”57  These 
companies that have not explored pooling arrangements 
are missing valuable commercial opportunities for 
research and development investment.
II.   Federal Tax Standards for Technology 
Transfer and Patent Donations
Patent rights granted to patentees are arguably 
extensions of a government’s taxation powers, thus 
it is no surprise that the field of patent law is strictly 
regulated under existing U.S. tax laws.58  Specifically, 
“[in] the patent area, the most frequently arising issues 
with respect to the tax laws are whether a transfer 
of patent rights is a sale or a non-exclusive license; 
whether royalties from a patent are capital gains or 
ordinary income; and…whether and when royalties 
are deductible.”59  The “patent pool paradox”60 raises 
additional tax issues for the effective transfer of patent 
rights as charitable contributions.61  The following 
sections explore the parameters of tax benefits available 
to participants in patent pools through licensing or 
donative arrangements.
A. Historical Governance of Patent Transfers
A patent right is a property right and is 
56.  Id. at 89.
57.  Id. at 95-96; see also Wesley M. Cohen, Akira Goto, Akiya 
Nagata, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Wash, R&D Information 
Flows and Patenting in Japan and the United States, in Econ., L. & 
Intell. Prop. 123, 135 (Ove Granstrand ed. 2003) (“[I]n complex 
product industries, firms rarely have proprietary control over all 
the essential complementary components of the technologies they 
are developing.  Firms hold rights over technologies that others 
need, and vice-versa, creating a condition of mutual dependence 
that fosters extensive cross-licensing, related negotiations and 
information sharing.”).
58.  See Ove Granstrand, Innovations and Intellectual Property 
Studies: An Introduction and Overview of a Developing Field, 15, 
in Econ., L. & Intell. Prop. 9, 15 (Ove Granstrand ed. 2003) 
(“Handing out privileges and property rights was (and is) simply a 
handy way for rulers and governments to influence the economics 
of innovation…In fact, this policy could be seen as a special use of 
taxation powers, in the sense that some of these powers are handed 
over under certain conditions to innovators who, at their discretion 
for a limited time, can tax consumers through higher prices on the 
innovations.”).
59.  I.R.S. Non-Docketed Advice Rev. 5395 (Aug. 7, 1998).
60.  I.R.S. Chief Counsel Advisory 201025072, at *3 (Jan. 27, 
2009) (General Counsel presentation).
61.  See 47A C.J.S. Internal Revenue § 211 (2011).
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transferable.62  The transferred right is “the right to 
exclude.”63  Since charitable contributions of patent 
rights are a relatively recent phenomenon, much of 
the legal record has concerned corporate or trustee 
dealings.64  Notwithstanding, it is clear that until 
recently the standard for valuation of transferred 
patent rights, whether pooled or not, was fair market 
value.  Conversely, acquired patents were extended 
amortization rights for basis in cost.65 It was during this 
era that companies such as Dow Chemical and Xerox 
recouped millions from over-inflated patent portfolios 
through strategic tax-friendly transfers. 66
B. Modern Governance of Charitable IP 
Donations
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 
62.  See Vakerics, supra note 37, at 3 (“The patent laws 
specifically provide that patents shall have the attributed of personal 
property.  The fact that patents are a form of property has also 
been recognized by the Supreme Court. More precisely, a patent 
is generally viewed as a form of intellectual property, as the patent 
grant itself is an intangible legal right. As a form of property, a 
patent can be the subject of an assignment which transfers title to 
the patent from the patentee to the assignee.”).
63.  Special Equipment v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378 (1945).
64.  See Charitable Contributions of Intellectual Property, 
Licensing Econ. Rev., (Oct 2003); see also, e.g., Appeal of 
National Pneumatic Co., 5 B.T.A. 637 (1926) (“No hard and fast 
rule can be laid down for determining the value of patents paid 
in for capital stock of a corporation…The value is a question 
of fact in any case.”); Mitchell Camera Corp. v. Comm’r, 1947 
WL 8088, at *1 (T.C. June 24, 1947) (bemoaning the absence 
of a statutory formula for determining depreciation of acquired 
patents); Cutter Lab. Inc., v. Lyophile-Cryochem Corp., 179 F.2d 
80, 80 (9th Cir. 1949) (addressing patent pools and evaluating the 
royalty-free exchange between two firms concentrated on different 
technologies); Talge v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 836, 836 (W.D. 
Mo. 1964) (distinguishing gift tax from income tax responsibilities 
for patents transferred in trust); Thomson v. U.S., 1969 WL 175, at 
*1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 1969) (advising against wholesale denial of 
capital gains treatment for royalty-based exchange of patents).
65.  I.R.S. Non-Docketed Advice Rev. 5395 (Aug. 7, 1998); 
see also Catherine L. Hammond, The Amortization of Intangible 
Assets: § 197 of the Internal Revenue Code Settles the Confusion, 27 
Conn. L. Rev. 915, 933-34 (1995).
66.  See Ashish et al., supra note 27, at 90 (“In 1997 Xerox had 
8,000 patents, earning only $8.5 million in revenues, not covering 
even the maintenance costs. Xerox set in motion a systematic 
process for cataloguing and evaluating its patent portfolio, pruning 
and giving away (often to universities) patents it did not wish to 
keep.”); Ron Layton & Peter Bloch, Please Donate Patents on the 
Shelf; Tax Benefits can be Focused for Greater Good, Legal Times 
Magazine, Mar. 15, 2004, at 2 (“The value of donations has 
been clearly significant.  Speaking for Dow Chemical at a 2001 
conference, Rick Gross provided some hard numbers.  He said 
Dow had discovered that ’25 percent of our patents had no business 
value.  We downsized the portfolio over 10,000 patents and saved 
over $40 million in five years.  Additionally, the donation of unused 
intellectual property resulted in millions of dollars of tax credits 
over the past six years.’”).
altered this landscape dramatically, eliminating the 
fair market value standard.67  While the Act does not 
establish new standards for effective contributions,68 
it reduces the monetary incentives for charitable IP 
donations.69  The intent of the Act was “to prevent 
taxpayers from claiming a deduction in excess of basis 
with respect to charitable contributions of intellectual 
property,” fueled by the “highly speculative” nature of 
IP valuation resulting in charities receiving assets “of 
questionable value” offsetting significant tax benefits to 
donor taxpayers.70   
 Title 26 of the U.S. Code, Section 170, 
governing charitable IP contributions, can now be 
summarized as follows:71
1. A contribution is deductible only 
if made to an organization…
organized and operated for 
religious, charitable, scientific, 
67.  See Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 882, 118 Stat. 1418, 1627 
(2004); Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Giving Intellectual 
Property, 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1721, 1746 (2006) (“[The Act] 
eliminates the fair market value standard and reduces the amount 
a donor can deduct.  The new legislation applies to most forms 
of intellectual property, including patents, certain copyrights, 
trademarks, trade names, trade secrets, and know-how, certain 
software, and similar intellectual property or applications or 
registrations of such property.”); see also 47A C.J.S. Internal Revenue 
§ 211, supra note 61, at 3 (“The 2004 Jobs Creation Act adds the 
rules that a deduction for the contribution of patents and other 
intellectual property is limited to the fair market value of the patent 
of the donor’s basis in it, whichever is less.  The donor can take an 
additional deduction, however, for income earned by the donee 
from the contributed property; the amount of the deduction is 
limited by a sliding percentage scale provided in the Code.”).
68.  I.R.S. Non-Docketed Advice Rev. 5395 (Aug. 7, 1998) 
(“Where less than substantial rights to a patent are transferred, the 
right conveyed is merely a license, giving the licensee no title in the 
patent.”); see also 47A C.J.S. Internal Revenue § 211, supra note 61, 
at 2 (“Generally, a charitable deduction will be disallowed, where 
the taxpayer retains control over the purported gift.  Delivery of 
a charitable contribution under the Code occurs when title in the 
property vests in the donee so as to provide the donee with power 
to exercise dominion and control…As a rule, a contribution in 
the statutory sense proceeds from a ‘detached and disinterested 
generosity’ and not from the anticipation of economic benefit, 
or other specific, measurable quid pro quo.”); Rev. Rul. 2003-28, 
2003-1 C.B. 594 (denying a charitable contribution to a donee 
contributing a patent to a university but “retaini[ng] a substantial 
right such as the right to license the patent to others”); Nguyen 
& Maine, supra note 67, at 1739-40 (“In order to qualify for an 
income tax charitable deduction under [S]ection 170 of the Internal 
Revenue Code…the taxpayer must transfer “all substantial rights” 
in a patent, defined as ‘all rights which are of value at the time the 
rights to the patent are transferred.”).
69.  See Nguyen & Maine, supra note 67, at 1725.
70.  See S. Rep. No. 108-192, at 217 (2003).
71.  See e.g., Joseph E. Olsen, Federal Taxation of IP Transfers § 
5.12 (2009).
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literary or educational purposes…
with no earnings inuring to the 
benefit of any private shareholder 
or individual…and the 
organization must not attempt to 
influence legislation;72
2. The amount of charitable 
deduction is limited to the lesser 
of the basis of the property or fair 
market value;73
3. Further deduction is allowable to 
the taxpayer according to a sliding 
scale of the future income that the 
charitable organization receives 
from the donation;74 and,
4. This qualified deduction extends 
only up to twelve years beyond 
the donation,75 and applies to 
amounts in excess of the original 
claimed deduction.76
Other restrictions for charitable contributions 
include:
1. Distributions from donor advised 
funds that are for non-charitable 
purposes are taxable, as are 
certain transactions between 
a donor advised fund and its 
donors, donor advisors, or related 
persons;77
2. Transfers of property to a 
charitable organization that are 
directly related to the donor’s 
business and made with a 
reasonable expectation of financial 
return equivalent to the value of 
72.  See  I.R.C. § 170(c). 
73.  See  § 170(e)(1)(B)(iii). 
74.  See §§ 170(m)(1), 6050L.  A donor is allowed an 
additional charitable deduction based on a sliding-scale percentage 
of qualified donee income from donated qualified intellectual 
property over a to-year period.  “Qualified donee income” is any 
net income received by or accrued to the donee that is allocable to 
qualified intellectual property.  “Qualified intellectual property” 
includes patents and other intellectual property but does not 
include property to certain private nonoperating (grant-making) 
foundations.  This additional deduction is allowed only to the 
extent that it exceeds the deduction amount originally claimed on 
the property contribution.
75.  See § 170(m)(7).
76.  See § 170(m)(2).
77.  See §§ 4966-67.
the transfers do not qualify for 
a charitable deduction but may 
qualify as a trade or business 
expense;78
3. “Contribution in the statutory 
sense proceeds from a detached 
and disinterested generosity 
and not from the anticipation 
of economic benefit, or other 
specific, measurable quid pro 
quo; and a taxpayer will be 
denied a charitable deduction 
for a conveyance of property 
motivated by an expectation of 
such substantial benefit as would 
provide a quid pro quo for the 
transfer and thereby destroy its 
charitable nature[;]”79
4. The fair market value of an 
undivided interest in a patent 
contributed to an appropriate 
organization is an allowable 
deduction as a charitable 
contribution;80
5. Patents are extended limited 
amortization rights when 
considering general business 
expensing;81
6. No deduction is allowed for a 
patent transfer when a donor 
retains the right to license 
the patent to others; rather, a 
deduction is allowed if a fully 
transferred patent is attached 
with certain restrictions for future 
license or transfer.82
7. Fraudulent intent could still be 
found when operating within all 
78.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(5) (2008).
79.  See 47A C.J.S. Internal Revenue § 211, supra note 61, at 2. 
80.  See Rev. Rul. 58-260, 1958-1 C.B. 126.       
81.  See I.R.C. § 197; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-6(a); 
Hammond, supra note 65 at 933-34.  “Section 197 allows for the 
straight-line method of amortization for almost all intangible assets 
over a fifteen-year period.  This rule applies to § 197 intangibles 
that were acquired in connection with a trade or business or in a 
separate transaction, but it does not apply to self-created intangible 
assets, such as the cost of creating a customer relationship through 
advertising.”  Patents qualify for amortization only to the extent that 
they were acquired through the acquisition of a trade or business.
82.  See Rev. Rul. 2003-28, supra note 68, at 1, 5.
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the rules of tax governance.83 
C. Standards of Exemption for Recipients of 
Donated IP
The discussion above focused on tax benefits 
available to a corporation donating IP to a qualifying 
charitable organization.  In Bluetooth SIG Inc. v. United 
States, the issue was whether an organization similar to 
a patent pool was entitled to exemption from federal 
income tax as a business league.84  This is the secondary 
tax analysis in forming a patent pool: whether a patent 
pool could be structured for maximum tax benefit.
 Bluetooth Special Interest Group (“SIG”) was 
a Delaware nonprofit created as the administrative 
executor of Bluetooth patents and trademarks 
transferred from Ericsson, Toshiba, IBM, Intel, and 
Nokia. 85  As the aggregator of these Bluetooth patents 
and trademarks, Bluetooth SIG develops technological 
specifications,86 promotes the technology,87 enforces its 
trademark,88 and certifies member technologies.89  SIG’s 
4,000 members were grouped according to membership 
classes; namely, those with greater development 
activities paid larger membership fees in exchange 
for reduced licensing fees.90  In the years following 
its inception, SIG’s revenues(income) increased 
exponentially from about $300,000 in 2000, to over 
$6.7 million in 2002, with corresponding increases in 
assets and profits.91 
83.  See S. Rep. No. 108-192, at 220 (2003) (“The fact that a 
right to receive payments meets the statutory standard of qualified 
interest does not immunize the contribution from such present-law 
rules.  Accordingly, under the provision, a donor’s contribution 
of intellectual property and right to receive payments could, 
depending on the facts and circumstances, result in impermissible 
private inurement or benefit, or be treated as an excess benefit 
transaction for purposes of intermediate sanctions.”).
84.  Bluetooth SIG Inc. v. United States, 611 F.3d 617, 617 (9th 
Cir. 2010).
85.  See id. at 618-19 (identifying Bluetooth as wireless data 
transmission technology providing “a language for electronic devices 
to talk to one another”).
86.  See id. at 619 (observing that Bluetooth SIG develops 
specifications “through meetings, conferences, working groups, and 
by sharing research results.”).
87.  See id. (noting that Bluetooth promoted products by 
“conduct[ing] market research, sponsor[ing] trade fairs, and 
publish[ing] handouts and flyers for trade shows and other events.”).
88.  See id. (noting that SIG employed counsel to protect its 
brand both domestically and abroad).
89.  See id. (noting that SIG collected member fees for 
compliance testing of new products and for any subsequent 
development).
90.  See id. at 620 (observing that original drafters of the pool 
were extended special class privileges, extended to only three other 
companies during the course of operation).
91.  See id. (stating that most of SIG’s revenue was derived 
 In 2002, SIG applied for a tax exemption 
under I.R.C. § 501(c)(6), which exempts, among 
others, “[b]usiness leagues” and “boards of trade.”92  
The IRS rejected SIG’s application, drawing a 
distinction between a business league’s promotion of 
improved business conditions and SIG’s promotion of 
a specific technology and discredited SIG’s proposal for 
“particular services to particular individuals.”93  Relying 
upon Treasury Regulation § 1.501(c)(6)-1,94 the Ninth 
Circuit applied a six-factor test to SIG’s status as a 
501(c)(6) nonprofit, finding that SIG failed the fourth 
and fifth prongs related to “engage[ment] in a business 
ordinarily conducted for profit,” and “activities that 
are directed to the improvement of business conditions 
of one or more lines of business as distinguished 
from the performance of particular services for 
individual persons.”95  The court reasoned that under 
the fourth prong, an association owning patents and 
promoting uniform practices associated with relevant 
patented technologies, while also granting licenses 
to its members under those patents, could not be an 
exempt business association.96  Relying upon Revenue 
Ruling 70-80, the court found that SIG failed the fifth 
prong of the six-factor test for failing to “benefit all or 
nearly all members” of a particular consumer-related 
industry.97  Essentially, any promotional activity of a 
trademark resulting in a competitive advantage within 
an industry prevents a finding of acceptable business 
league activity.98  By extension, within a collective, like 
SIG, fee structures that serve to reduce membership 
fees in exchange for enhanced surplus-producing 
from membership fees and product registration fees, in equal 
portion).
92.  See id. at 620-21.
93.  See id. at 621 (denoting the IRS’ reasoning to 
particularized service concerned the special status of Bluetooth 
developers, especially those within the higher ranks).
94.  See Treas. Reg. 1.501(c)(6)-1 (1960) (“An organization 
whose purpose is to engage in a regular business of a kind ordinarily 
carried on for profit, even though the business is conducted on 
a cooperative basis or produces only sufficient income to be self-
sustaining, is not a business league.”).
95.  See Bluetooth SIG, supra note 84, 611 F.3d  at 622-24.  
96.  Id.; see also Rev. Rul. 58-294, 1958-1 C.B. 244 (holding 
that an association did not qualify as a business league under section 
501(c)(6) when too heavily involved in ownership and promotion 
of patented products).
97.  Bluetooth SIG, supra note 84, 611 F.3d at 624-25; see 
also Rev. Rul. 70-80, 1970-1 C.B. 130 (stating that a “nonprofit 
trade association of manufacturers whose principal activity is 
the promotion of its members’ products under the associaiton’s 
registered trademark does not qualify for exemption under section 
501(c)(6) of the Code”).
98.  See Bluetooth SIG, supra note 84, 611 F.3d at 625.
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licensing fees do not benefit a definite industry 
overall.99  Moreover, SIG’s fee structure benefits some 
members over others, which is itself a bar to the 
business league exemption.100  Finally, an organization 
wishing to be recognized as a business league for 
tax purposes cannot make its primary mission the 
enhancement of its brand.101
III.  Case Study: Applying US Tax Standards to 
the Eco-Patent Commons
A.  What is the Eco-Patent Commons?
 One interesting case to consider is the Eco-
Patent Commons (“Commons”), a patent pool 
promoting tax benefits and public responsiveness 
of pooling cleantech resources.102  The emergence 
of the Commons can be traced to a resurgence of 
both environmental awareness and corporate social 
responsibilities.103  Leading companies are recognizing 
the finite nature of key resources and publicly 
seeking to “dematerialize” their businesses.104  But 
while global responsiveness may lead to universal 
gain, one drawback to the modern sustainable 
consciousness involves the systematic corporate 
greenwashing105 of industrial and retail goods.106  
The Commons, a partnership between private and 
99.  Id. at 626.
100.  Id. at 627-28.
101.  Id. at 628-29 (“Everything that SIG does supports, in 
one way or another, the Bluetooth brand which is the organization’s 
central asset and focus…Any benefit on the wireless communication 
industry or non-Bluetooth manufacturers was, in fact, merely 
incidental.”).
102.  See, e.g., World Bus. Council for Sustainable Dev. 
(WBCSD), http://www.wbcsd.org (last visited Mar. 18, 2011).
103.  See Paul Herman, The HIP Investor: Make Bigger 
Profits by Building a Better World 28 (2010) (noting American and 
Chinese consumer and investor sensitivities to corporate behavior).
104.  Id. at 20.
105.  See SourceWatch, Greenwashing, http://www.
sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Greenwashing (last visited April 
10, 2011) (“Greenwashing is the unjustified appropriation of 
environmental virtue by a company, an industry, a government, 
a politician or even a non-government organization to create a 
pro-environmental image, sell a product or a policy, or to try and 
rehabilitate their standing with the public decision makers after 
being embroiled in controversy.”).
106.  See Dr. Arlo Brady, The Greenrush: Eco-branding, 
Brandchannel (August 27, 2007), http://www.brandchannel.
com/brand_speak.asp?bs_id=174 (“The far ranging reach of the 
current greenrush has meant that globally, individuals are now 
coming into contact with green political and green business brands 
and messaging on a regular basis.  This increasing familiarity and 
exposure to background noise has resulted in a growing climate of 
suspicion . . . Many now believe that politicians and business leaders 
are just developing clever marketing/branding campaigns designed 
solely to increase sales or votes.”).
nonprofit organizations, takes a novel approach to 
environmentalism and corporate social responsibility 
by fostering environmentally beneficial technologies 
through the cooperative mechanisms of the patent 
pool.107  The modus at work is a collective effort to 
donate shelved patents from which other members, and 
even outside businesses and individuals, could draw 
from free of charge.108  Multilateral environmental and 
climate change agreements have emphasized the need 
to distribute environmentally sustainable technologies, 
and open access to patents is one way to meet this 
demand.109
 The Commons is housed within the World 
Sustainable Business Council, a “CEO-led, global 
association of some 200 companies dealing exclusively 
with business and sustainable development.”110  The 
Commons itself holds over one hundred “eco-friendly 
patents” pledged by eleven worldwide companies, 
including Bosch, Dow, DuPont, Fuji-Xerox, IBM, 
Pitney Bowes, Ricoh, Sony, Taisei, and Xerox.111  The 
Commons purport a philanthropic and industrial 
interest.112  While a membership fee is anticipated, 
107.  See World Bus. Council for Sustainable Dev. (WBCSD), 
Eco-Patent Commons Overview, http://www.wbcsd.org/templates/
TemplateWBCSD5/layout.asp?type=p&MenuId=MTQ3NQ&do
Open=
1&ClickMenu=LeftMenu (last visited Mar. 18, 2011) (“The 
Eco-Patent Commons, launched by IBM, Nokia, Pitney Bowes 
and Sony in partnership with the WBCSD, was founded on the 
commitment that anyone who wants to bring environmental 
benefits to market can use these patents to protect the environment 
and enable collaboration between businesses that foster new 
innovation.”).
108.  See Jo Bowman, The Eco-Patent Commons: Caring 
Through Sharing, in 3 WIPO Magazine, Mar. 2009, at 11.
109.  Krishna Ravi Srinivas, Sink or Swim: Eco-patent 
Commons and the Transfer of Environmentally Sustainable 
Technologies, International Centre for Sustainable Development 
(May 2008), http://ictsd.org/i/news/bioresreview/12098.
110.  See World Bus. Council for Sustainable Dev. 
(WBCSD), About the WBCSD,  http://www.wbcsd.org/templates/
TemplateWBCSD5/layout.asp?type=p&MenuId=NjA&doOpen=1
&ClickMenu=LeftMenu ((last visited Mar. 18, 2011).
111.  See WBCSD, Eco-Patent Commons Overview, supra 
note 107; see also Bowman, supra note 108, at 11 (noting that 
patents include “technology for removing liquid contaminants from 
groundwater,” a “method for recycling optical disks,” and “a system 
for recycling old mobile phone handsets”).
112.  See World Bus. Council for Sustainable Dev. 
(WBCSD), Eco-Patent Q&A,  http://www.wbcsd.org/templates/
TemplateWBCSD5/layout.asp?type=p&MenuId=MTU2Mg&
doOpen=1&ClickMenu=LeftMenu (last visited Mar. 18, 2011) 
(“While the Eco-Patent Commons clearly has an important 
philanthropic aspect, its benefits to the business pledging patents 
go beyond philanthropy.  By forming a Commons, members and 
non-members obtain free access to patents pledged by others, and 
the opportunity to leverage the Commons to further innovate and 
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technology selection for patent inclusion is left to 
donor businesses, and charitable contribution status 
related to patent renewal fees is inconclusive.113
B.   Are Charitable Contributions of IP Deductible 
in the Case of the Commons?
 The first analysis is whether domestic donors 
would be able to exploit beneficial tax provisions 
through assignment of patent rights to a collective 
licensing entity, such as the Eco-Patent Commons.  
This analysis must take into consideration the 
relevant tax provisions discussed above.  Specifically, 
the analysis centers around determination of several 
factors, including: the functional nature of the pool; 
the value of the donation and/or future income within 
explicit limitations; the degree of relation between the 
transferring parties; the relevancy of the donation to the 
donor’s business; the expectation of financial return; the 
anticipation of other benefit; whether ownership of the 
patent has been properly relinquished; and evidence of 
intentional circumvention of the Jobs Act framework.114 
1.  Is the Commons a qualified recipient?
 In order to qualify as a charitable contribution, 
a collective in this instance must be a non-political, 
charitable or scientific organization that does not 
benefit any private shareholder or individual.115  The 
Commons is a nonprofit located in Geneva promoting 
environmental awareness, efficiency, and innovation.116  
Under this standard, the Commons would seem 
to qualify as a qualified charitable recipient.  The 
Commons’ objective of fostering environmentally 
friendly technologies is seemingly indistinguishable 
from the objectives of similar environmental 
organizations, scientific organizations, or universities 
serving similar functions.
establish business relationships with businesses that have similar 
interests.”).
113.  Id. (It is possible that there could be tax benefits for 
making donations or pledges of patents, but it may be difficult to 
structure the Commons to enable that benefit, and it may require a 
greater degree of governance and operational cost than is currently 
being envisioned for the initiative.  In any event, this benefit 
would greatly depend on the pledger and facts surrounding its tax 
situation.”) (emphasis added).
114.  See infra Section II.
115.  See 26 U.S.C. I.R.C. § 170(c).
116.  See World Bus. Council for Sustainable Dev. (WBCSD), 
History of the WBCSD, http://www.wbcsd.org/templates/
TemplateWBCSD2/layout.asp?type=p&MenuId=NDEx&doOpe
n=1&ClickMenu=LeftMenu (last visited April 10, 2011); see also 
WBCSD, How to Join the Eco-Patent Commons, http://www.wbcsd.
org/web/projects/ecopatent/EcoPatentGroundRules.pdf (last visited 
April 10, 2011). 
2.  Is there value in the type of IP donated to 
the Commons?
 The value of a charitable donation for tax 
purposes is limited to the lesser of the donated 
instrument’s basis or fair market value, with an 
additional provision for equivalent gains to the 
charitable organization in excess of the reported 
tax claim.117  Critics of the Commons state that the 
majority of the patents held by the Commons are not 
very useful, since the intellectual property obstacles to 
green tech transfer are relatively few and usability of 
donated property is questionable.118   Moreover, some 
donor parties to the Commons have freely confessed 
the limited market value of donated property.119  Given 
the testimonial indifferences to shelved patents, and the 
complexities involved in aggregating enough property 
rights to develop a product for market from a pool 
sourced in goodwill, it is difficult to conceptualize a 
standard, or even range, of return for most charitable IP 
supporting tax credits.
3. What is the nature of donor/donee 
relations within the Commons?
 Some transactions between interrelated 
parties are taxable.120  In this case, substantial donors 
in conjunction with the WBCSD established the 
Commons jointly.121  If those foundational donor 
117.  See I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(iii); see also § 170(m)(1)-(2), 
(7).
118.  See Hideo Doi, Japan’s Green Technology Plan: Managing 
Intellectual Property, International Centre for Sustainable 
Development (May 7, 2010), http://ictsd.org/i/press/ictsd-in-the-
news/75439/.  See generally John H. Barton, Intellectual Property 
and Access to Clean Energy Technologies in Developing Countries: 
An Analysis of Solar Photovoltaic, Biofuel and Wind Technologies, 
ICTSD Trade and Sustainable Energy Series Issue Paper No. 2, 
International Centre for Sunstainable Development (December 
2007); see also Srinivas, supra note 109 (noting that “while the 
patents available under the Eco-Patent Commons represent a 
starting point, they have a very limited application in the further 
development of technologies in key sectors”).
119.  See Steven Seidenberg, Patent Giveaway: Companies 
Donate Patents to Promote Ecologically Friendly Innovation, Inside 
Counsel, (April 1, 2009) (http://www.insidecounsel.com/
Issues/2009/April-2009/Pages/Patent-Giveaway.aspx) (“Many 
patents for green technology will never be donated to the EPC, and 
that’s fine with EPC’s backers.  They expect businesses will hang 
on to patents that generate significant revenue”); id. (wherein Julie 
Rakestraw of DuPont notes, “If we won’t commercialize it, and it’s 
within EPC guidelines, that makes it a really good candidate for 
donating to the Commons”).
120.  See I.R.C. §§ 4966-67 (noting that interrelated parties 
include those with conflicts of interest brought about by personal 
stakes or invested interests in both donor and donee).
121.  See WBCSD, Eco-Patent Commons Overview, supra note 
107.
42 Spring 2011
parties are involved in a manner which indirectly 
benefits their companies, for instance in designing 
beneficial licensing structures as discussed in Bluetooth 
SIG, then any donations based upon such interactions 
could be barred from charitable status.
4.   Are patents donated to the Commons 
extensions of donor businesses?
 Transfers of property to a charitable 
organization that are directly related to the donor’s 
business and made with a reasonable expectation 
of financial return equivalent to the value of the 
transfers do not qualify for a charitable deduction.122  
The Commons promotes environmental efficiency 
and renewable energy technologies, though donor 
organizations are not necessarily active in either 
industry.123  The first clause in the conflicts rule 
would thus hinge on general corporate benefit.  In 
discussing corporate gain, some donors have cited 
opportunistic gain, the opportunity to draw upon 
others’ technologies, or entertain a valuable network 
of expertise.124 Critics, meanwhile, have asserted 
reputational benefits, noting that the Commons is 
free of charge, or that competing companies typically 
engage in intercompany exchange solely to avoid 
impending litigation.125  Nonpecuniary gains, such as 
these, would likely not undermine the rule.  However, 
because donors retain ownership of donated property 
in the sense of renewal fees, a presumption of some 
financial gain could arise.  To illustrate in a practical 
scenario, a donor company could assign the pool the 
licensing rights of a blocked patent in the hopes that 
similar assignments from others would create sufficient 
licensing rights in toto for future product development; 
this new potential, whether construed as costs saved 
from negotiated licenses or a kind of market expansion, 
would signify a financial return.
5.   Are donations made to the Commons 
detached and disinterested?
 A taxpayer will be denied a charitable 
deduction for a conveyance of property motivated by 
122.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(5) (2008).
123.  See Seidenberg, supra note 119 (expressing that green 
technology “is interdisciplinary and covers such a wide variety of 
technology – from biotech to business methods, from material 
science to physics, from mechanical engineering (wind power) 
to photovoltaics, geology (geothermal) and ocean sciences (tidal 
power)”).
124.  Id; see also Bowman, supra note 108 (quoting Donal 
O’Connell of Nokia).
125.  See Doi, supra note 118.
an expectation of such substantial benefit as would 
provide a quid pro quo for the transfer and thereby 
destroy its charitable nature.126  Here, the nonpecuniary 
interests discussed in the previous section would 
likely demonstrate expectations distinguishable from 
“detached and disinterested generosity.”127  Any 
donation motivated by improved public relations, 
increased marketability, or other intangible gains, 
would not qualify as a charitable deduction.
6.   Are any rights withheld by donors giving 
to the Commons?
 No deduction is allowed for a patent transfer 
when a donor retains the right to license the patent to 
others, but a deduction is allowed for a transfer carrying 
certain restrictions for future license or transfer, 
limited by the reduction in fair market value that the 
restriction creates.128  Members to the Commons “join 
by placing at least one patent into the database, which 
they continue to maintain, paying fees as needed.”129  
As noted by an IBM executive, the Commons  only 
employs the “ecological uses” of donated patents, 
meaning donors retain exclusive rights to license 
mainline uses of patents.130  Effectively, “you can 
have your cake and eat it too.”131  Any retained rights, 
whether to license outside of or within the pool, would 
be barred by charitable recognition.  Lastly, Congress 
suggested that a bar to recognition may be applied 
when operating outside of the purpose and scope of the 
rules.132
C.  Is the Commons Exempt from Taxation as a 
501(c)(6) Organization?
 Applying Bluetooth SIG to the same model, 
a framework for tax-exempt status of the patent pool 
can be illuminated.  In Bluetooth SIG, the Ninth 
Circuit focused on two principles that are relevant to 
the Commons example: 1) engagement in a business 
ordinarily performed for profit, and 2) personalized 
performance.133  More specifically, the court barred SIG 
126.  See 47A C.J.S. Internal Revenue § 211, supra note 61.
127.  Id.
128.  See Rev. Rul. 2003-28, supra note 68.
129.  Srivinas, supra note 109.
130.  Seidenberg, supra note 119.
131.  Id.
132.  See S. Rep. No. 108-192, *220 (2003).  (warning that 
technical obeyance of the newly minted tax rules “could, depending 
on the facts and circumstances, result in impermissible private 
inurement or private benefit, or be treated as an axcess benefit 
transaction for purposes of intermediate sanctions”).
133.  See Bluetooth SIG, supra note 84, 611 F.3d at 617, 622.
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from representation as a business league under section 
501(c)(6) for the following reasons: owning patents and 
promoting them as such; granting licenses with respect 
to owned patents; conducting operations not benefiting 
substantially all members of a defined trade; branding 
to give itself, members, or its products a competitive 
edge; profiteering; administering inequitable treatment 
within the pool; and, self-branding as its central 
focus.134
 Similarly to SIG, the Commons is engaging 
in business ordinarily performed for profit.  As 
discussed above, the Commons licenses its intellectual 
property freely to members within and, in some 
instances, beyond the pool.  Currently, the very 
nature of licensing is at odds with the tax code:  while 
donor companies hope for future profitable uses of 
their donated property in order to increase charitable 
deductions,135 an administrative pool, whether serving 
the public interest or not, is restricted from conducting 
business in a way ordinarily considered enterprising 
or profitable.136  Here, a tax analysis would likely turn 
upon a myopic focus on use of an enterprising tool, 
as opposed to the broader consideration of social 
gains in the fields of innovation and environmental 
stewardship..  Perhaps one example of a distinction 
would be if patents were licensed freely, not to member 
contributors, but to third world or other neglected 
representative groups.137
 The Commons may also incorporate a certain 
degree of personalized performance.  The Commons is 
still in its infancy, having yet to even establish standard 
funding protocols.138 Furthermore, the Commons is 
not limited to a specific technology, or even industry, 
as was the case in Bluetooth SIG.139  As observed, green 
tech itself is an interdisciplinary idea covering diverse 
technologies from biotech to business methods.140  
The Commons accepts properties from all fields, as 
long as they have in their donated form a “purely 
environmental aim.”141  In practice, this ranges from 
methods for recycling mobile phones to automotive 
134.  Id. at 622-29; see also Rev. Rul. 58-294, 1958-1 C.B. 
244; Rev. Rul. 70-80, 1970-1 C.B. 130.
135.  See 26 U.S.C.I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(iii); see also 26 
U.S.C.I.R.C. § 170(m)(1)-(2), (7).
136.  See Bluetooth SIG, supra note 84, 611 F.3d at 622; see also 
Rev. Rul. 58-294, 1958-1 C.B. 244.
137.  See generally Mimura, supra note 8.
138.  See WBCSD, Eco-Patent Q&A, supra note 112.
139.  See Bluetooth SIG, supra note 84, 611 F.3d at 624.
140.  See Seidenberg, supra note 119.
141.  Bowman, supra note 108 (quoting Maria Mendiluce of 
the Commons).
patents.142. Nevertheless, the potential for greenwashing 
is apparent in this fund.  A recent WBCSD press 
release announced that HP “became the latest company 
to release some of its intellectual property to the 
public good, with three green patents added to the 
[Commons].143   Because the Commons was created by 
corporate interests, and is evidently still administered 
by such, the resulting functionality of the Commons 
may arguably serve as little more than a vertically 
integrated PR machine.144 Too much self-interested 
investment in the Eco-Patent Commons at the expense 
of environmental goals or cleantech innovation could 
preclude exemption. 
D. Summary
Having analyzed a popular, socially beneficial 
international patent pool for the applicability of United 
States tax provisions rewarding charitable dissemination 
of IP, some conclusions can be made about the state 
of United States tax policy.  First, there is limited 
opportunity for domestic patent pools to mirror the 
goodwill successes of the Commons.  In that sense, 
little has changed since the bleak 2006 report by Xuan-
Thao Nguyen and Jeffrey A. Maine, critiquing United 
States policy limitations that dissuade charitable IP 
giving, and thus national IP development.145  However, 
there are clear loopholes through which a patent 
pool may operate to encourage charitable giving 
upon careful crafting.  Thus, a patent pool with a 
social or charitable mission receiving contributions of 
valid and valuable patents may qualify its donors for 
charitable deductions if 1) relational boundaries are 
observed, 2) donors are not motivated primarily by 
pecuniary or nonpecuniary interests of a commercially 
beneficial nature, 3) and patents are donated wholly 
and purposefully without reservation.  If the current 
collective greenwashing becomes actual greenthinking, 
a U.S. Commons with maximized tax benefits is viable, 
for the cleantech industry at least, even under restrictive 
tax policies. 
142.  See Bowman, supra note 108.
143.  See World Bus. Council For Sustainable Dev. (WBCSD), 
Press Release (July 1, 2010) http://www.wbcsd.org.  The author is 
unfamiliar with any green patenting or other color-coding practices 
of the USPTO.
144.  In the June 2010 Commons newsletter, primary contacts 
include a vice president and corporate counsel of IBM.
145.  See Nguyen & Maine, supra note 67.
